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CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY AND
JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF
INSIDER TRADING
Jill E. Fisch*
ABSTRACT
The Texas Gulf Sulphur decision began what has become a fifty-year
project of developing U.S. insider trading regulation through judicial law-
making. During the course of that project, the courts developed a complex,
fraud-based approach to determining the scope of liability. The approach
has led, in many cases, to doctrinal uncertainty, a result that is reflected in
the recent decisions in Newman, Salman, and Martoma.
In the face of this uncertainty, many commentators have called for a
legislative solution. This article argues, however, that the true challenge of
insider trading regulation is a lack of consensus about the appropriate
scope of the prohibition. On the one hand, insider trading regulation seeks
to address the potential unfairness resulting from wealth and privileged ac-
cess. On the other hand, it seeks to preserve sufficient incentives for re-
search to promote market efficiency.
In the face of these competing policy concerns, a legislative definition is
likely to be both under- and over-inclusive. Judicial lawmaking may offer a
superior alternative because it, unlike legislation, can employ constructive
ambiguity—deliberately vague standards that require contextual analysis.
By enabling policymakers to maintain ambiguity about the permissible
limits on the acquisition and use of market-sensitive information, judicial
lawmaking helps to balance the competing concerns that animate the de-
bate over insider trading.
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I. INTRODUCTION
THIS symposium celebrates the fiftieth anniversary of the decisionby the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in SEC v. Texas GulfSulphur (hereinafter referred to as TGS).1 TGS was remarkable in
that it was the first federal appellate court decision to accept the SEC’s
theory that insider trading constituted federal securities fraud.2 TGS also
started the courts on the fifty-year project of defining the scope of the
insider trading prohibition—deciding what conduct is legal and what is
not—with relatively limited input from Congress.3 The federal law of in-
sider trading is one of the most prominent examples of judicial
lawmaking.4
I have written elsewhere that judicial lawmaking can be advantageous
in several ways.5 It provides flexibility, which is particularly important in
the context of insider trading, since the methodologies by which those
with privileged access can exploit informational advantages continue to
evolve over time.6 Many of the core components of today’s insider trad-
ing—hedge funds,7 expert networks,8 and high tech tools for conveying
information such as burner phones and self-destroying messages9—did
not exist at the time of the TGS decision. Judicial lawmaking is also incre-
1. See generally SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc).
2. See, e.g., Andrew Verstein, Insider Trading in Commodities Markets, 102 VA. L.
REV. 447, 458–59 (2016) (observing that TGS was “the first federal court decision to ad-
dress insider trading of securities under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Rule 10b-5”); Roberta Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information–a Breach in
Search of a Duty, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 88 (1998) (terming TGS “[T]he first major
court case affirming the use of Rule 10b-5 in actions against those who trade on undis-
closed, material corporate information”).
3. Cf. Jill E. Fisch, Federal Securities Fraud Litigation as a Lawmaking Partnership,
93 WASH U. 453, 455 (2015) (explaining the respective contributions of Congress and the
SEC to this project and terming the resulting collaboration a “lawmaking partnership”).
4. See, e.g., id. at 476–77 (explaining that the courts moved first to accept the premise
that insider trading constituted federal securities fraud and to develop a theory as to why
insider trading was fraudulent).
5. See id. at 454. For a more detailed analysis of the literature defending a common
law approach to lawmaking, see Frank Partnoy, Synthetic Common Law, 53 KAN. L. REV.
281, 291–97 (2005).
6. See Fisch, supra note 3 at 484–85.
7. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317) (describing emergence of new types of traders,
including “hedge fund rapid-fire volatility traders, index fund investors, [and] sophisticated
value investors”).
8. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, Knowledge Is Money, but the Peril Is Obvious, N.
Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 26, 2012), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/26/knowledge
-is-money-but-the-peril-is-obvious/ [https://perma.cc/4S4M-F8FS] (explaining the expert
network business model).
9. See, e.g., Kara Scannell, Insider Trading Schemes Using Encrypted Apps Alarm
FBI, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/7fad3fca-8438-11e7-94e2-
c5b903247afd [https://perma.cc/8ZZD-HD9C] (reporting about insider trading case in
which the defendant “used a phone messaging app to pass encrypted, self-destructing
messages to three friends about confidential corporate takeovers”).
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mental and context specific.10 In identifying the problems associated with
a specific transaction, decisional law does not have to consider the chal-
lenges of extending the line to circumstances not before the court. Finally,
judicial lawmaking may be less vulnerable to the political pressures faced
by Congress and the SEC.11
On the other hand, judicial lawmaking has its weaknesses.12 It can cre-
ate uncertainty, relative to a statute or rule, about exactly what conduct is
prohibited.13 In turn, uncertainty can increase prosecutorial discretion.
Judicial lawmaking can also stretch the limits of institutional competence
with respect to issues like the impact of a particular rule on market effi-
ciency.14 Finally, and perhaps most important, judicial lawmaking reduces
accountability.
A series of recent cases—Newman,15 Salman,16 and Martoma17—apply
the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Dirks v. SEC18 to address the scope
of liability associated with a tip of material nonpublic information. This
“tipping trio” provides an example of the uncertainty associated with
judge-made law.
One possible solution is for Congress to clarify the scope of insider
trading liability through legislation, a solution many commentators have
recommended.19 A legislative fix is challenging, however, largely because
of continued and widespread disagreement about the fundamental nor-
mative question—the appropriate breadth of the insider trading prohibi-
tion. The disagreement stems primarily from an ongoing disconnect
between two themes that animate insider trading law. On the one hand,
10. See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1076–78 (2000) (attributing similar advan-
tages to judicial lawmaking with respect to Delaware corporate law).
11. See, e.g., Andrew Ackerman & Aruna Viswanatha, SEC Bickering Stalls Mary Jo
White’s Agenda, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2015, 9:55 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-
bickering-derailswhites-agenda-1433374702 [https://perma.cc/5JWH-X2C4] (describing
politicization of SEC enforcement decisions).
12. See, e.g., Partnoy, supra note 5 at 300–13 (identifying the limits to common law
adjudication as a source of legal rules).
13. See Ben Protess & Matthew Goldstein, Appeal Judges Hint at Doubts in Insider
Case, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Apr. 22, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/
appeals-court-raises-doubts-about-governments-insider-trading-case/ [https://perma.cc/
G2YL-79RQ] (citing concern expressed by Second Circuit Judge Barrington Parker during
the oral argument in United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), that “an air of
uncertainty hung over Wall Street without a ‘bright line’ to clarify what constituted illegal
trading”).
14. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91 TEX. L. REV. 479,
504 (2013) (exploring how considerations of institutional competence may affect the
courts’ approach to statutory interpretation).
15. Newman, 773 F.3d at 442.
16. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 429 (2016).
17. United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 67 (2d Cir. 2017).
18. 463 U.S. 646 (1953).
19. See, e.g., Robert Anello, Letter on Insider Trading from a Confused Wall Streeter,
FORBES (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2017/09/06/letter-on-insider-
trading-from-a-confused-wall-streeter/2/#4a6c13dd1c70 [https://perma.cc/2DQG-47UC]
(“It is time for Congress to step up and straighten the insider trading mess out by passing
clear legislation”).
752 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
insider trading regulation has its origins in fraud and deception, which
require a focus on the wrongfulness associated with acquiring or using
information. On the other hand, public condemnation of insider trading
appears largely rooted in perceptions about the unfairness of using privi-
leged access to information for personal gain.
To the extent that commentators and policymakers continue to disa-
gree as to the “right” scope of an insider trading prohibition, a deliber-
ately ambiguous legal prohibition may be optimal. Here is where judicial
lawmaking has the upper hand. Judge-made law can maintain greater am-
biguity than legislation with respect to the potential scope of liability.20 In
the insider trading context, this enables the law to balance two key but
conflicting policy concerns—perceptions about the potential unfairness
resulting from informational advantages and preserving sufficient incen-
tives for the acquisition and use of information to promote market
efficiency.
II. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF
INSIDER TRADING
As the articles in this Issue highlight, TGS marked the beginning of the
judicial process of developing U.S. insider trading law. It is important to
recognize, however, that it was the SEC that first decided that trading on
the basis of material nonpublic information should be illegal. In an ad-
ministrative proceeding, In re Cady, Roberts, the SEC suspended a bro-
ker for executing discretionary trades in his customers’ accounts on the
basis of material nonpublic information.21 As SEC Chairman Bill Cary
explained, the case was “of first impression and one of signal importance
in our administration of the federal securities acts.”22 Notably, neither the
statute nor existing case law appeared to support a broad insider trading
prohibition, leading one commentator to term the decision “a regulatory
power-grab by the SEC.”23
The TGS decision converted Cady, Roberts from a policy gamble to the
law of the land.24 TGS both accepted the SEC’s broad parity of informa-
tion view of insider trading25 and accepted, for the courts, the responsibil-
ity of formulating the parameters for insider trading liability. The
Supreme Court would not consider the question of whether insider trad-
20. Concededly, ambiguity is not limited to judicial lawmaking. Statutes can also be
ambiguous, but various doctrines constrain the permissible scope of statutory ambiguity,
such as the vagueness doctrine. See, e.g., Mila Sohoni, Notice and the New Deal, 62 DUKE
L.J. 1169, 1175–76 (2014) (explaining the vagueness doctrine and related limits on statutory
ambiguity imposed by the Due Process Clause).
21. In re Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
22. Id. at 1.
23. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent
Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589, 1595 (1999).
24. See id. at 1595 (explaining that “the Second Circuit vindicated and validated the
Commission’s action in [TGS]”).
25. See Verstein, supra note 2 at 459 (stating that TGS “embraced an expansive theory
of liability”).
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ing constituted federal securities fraud for a dozen years, and when it did,
the Court cut back on the scope of liability articulated by the Second
Circuit.26 Nonetheless, in Chiarella, the Court agreed with the basic pre-
mise of TGS: that insider trading was, in appropriate circumstances, a
violation of § 10(b).27
Subsequently, the law of insider trading was developed through a series
of decisions in which the courts responded to SEC enforcement decisions
by formulating appropriate policy guidelines to structure the scope of lia-
bility. Thus, for example, in Dirks, the Supreme Court explained that the
personal benefit test was required to determine when a tippee was pro-
hibited from using material nonpublic information. As the Court ex-
plained, “Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person
knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider and
trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market ana-
lysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a
healthy market.”28 Similarly in O’Hagan, the Court accepted the misap-
propriation theory of insider trading liability, finding it was “tuned to an
animating purpose of the Exchange Act: to insure honest securities mar-
kets and thereby promote investor confidence.”29
To be fair, the courts were not the exclusive source of insider trading
law. Congress weighed in from time to time,30 primarily by making minor
adjustments to insider trading law while also confirming the parameters
of the liability theories developed by the courts.31 Importantly, Congress
repeatedly declined to displace the judicial role by adopting a statute de-
fining insider trading.32 The SEC also played a role both through the en-
26. United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 229 (1980).
27. See id. at 230 (“[S]ilence in connection with the purchase or sale of securities may
operate as a fraud actionable under § 10(b) despite the absence of statutory language or
legislative history specifically addressing the legality of nondisclosure”).
28. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1953).
29. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997).
30. Congress also included a prohibition on short swing trading in the original Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 that arguably addresses insider trading directly, § 16(b). Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 16(b), 48 Stat. 881, 896 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 78p(b)
(2012)). Some commentators view § 16(b) as an important congressional restriction on in-
sider trading. See, e.g., Merritt Fox, Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incen-
tives: A Unified Theory of Section 16(b), 92 MICH. L. REV. 2088, 2091–92 (1994) (arguing
that Section 16(b) “probably plays a larger day-to-day role in constraining the behavior of
America’s corporate executives than Rule 10b-5’s headline-grabbing, judge-made stric-
tures against insider trading”). But see Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the
Management of Publicly Held Companies, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 391, 399 (1991) (arguing that
the primary purpose of § 16(b) is not to regulate insider trading, but to deter insiders “from
manipulating corporate affairs to create corporate opportunities to trade corporate stock
profitably”).
31. See, e.g., Steve Thel, Statutory Findings and Insider Trading Regulation, 50 VAND.
L. REV. 1091 (1997) (arguing that congressional findings made in connection with the In-
sider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 can be read as an endorse-
ment of the misappropriation theory).
32. See Fisch, supra note 3 at 478–79 (noting congressional opportunities and failures
to define insider trading through legislation).
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forcement theories that it pursued in the courts33 and through formal
rulemaking.34 Again, the SEC’s efforts did not displace the role of the
courts; rather, the courts rejected enforcement efforts that, in their views,
reflected excessive “enforcement zeal.”35
The recent trio of cases involving the scope of tippee liability, Newman,
Salman, and Martoma, did not deviate from this approach. All three cases
sought addressed the appropriate application of the Dirks personal bene-
fit test—which is the requirement that a tipper receive a personal benefit
for his or her tip of material nonpublic information to constitute a breach
of fiduciary duty—to varying factual contexts. In Newman, the context
was that of remote tippees. The defendants, Newman and Chiasson, were
third and fourth degree tippees who made millions of dollars trading the
stock of Dell and NVIDIA. The information on which they traded came
from corporate insiders and was relayed through two separate tipping
chains consisting of various Wall Street analysts. Significantly, the New-
man court found that neither of the corporate insiders tipped for direct
monetary gain and that the “evidence established that NVIDIA and
Dell’s investor relations personnel routinely ‘leaked’ earnings data in ad-
vance of quarterly earnings.”36 Under these circumstances, the court con-
cluded that the government had failed to meet its burden of establishing
either that the information was leaked through a breach of fiduciary duty
or that the defendants knew or reasonably could have known of the exis-
tence of such a breach.
Arguably Newman was a hard case because of the challenge of address-
ing the limits of information use in the complex world of today’s hedge
funds.37 The Second Circuit’s decision that the government had over-
reached generated extensive criticism.38 Salman presented a far less novel
set of facts.39 A Citigroup insider, Maher Kara, provided material non-
public information to his brother, Michael, with whom he enjoyed a close
relationship. Michael provided the information to Salman, his close friend
33. See, e.g., Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement:
A Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 155–56 (1990) (critically
describing this approach as “regulation by enforcement”).
34. See Fisch, supra note 3 at 481–82 (describing SEC rule making addressed to insider
trading).
35. Id. at 482.
36. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 454–55 (2014).
37. See, e.g., Roger Parloff, The Gray Art of Not Quite Insider Trading, FORTUNE
(Aug. 15, 2013), http://fortune.com/2013/08/15/the-gray-art-of-not-quite-insider-trading/
[https://perma.cc/T4BM-AAZK] (describing “the layers of gray that wash over the world
in which hedge fund portfolio managers and stock analysts operate”).
38. The critical commentary is too extensive to list. For an example, see Matt Turner,
Sheriff of Wall Street: We’re No Longer Able to Bring Certain Insider Trading Cases, BUS.
INSIDER (Jan. 17, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/preet-bharara-on-newman-case-
2016-1 [https://perma.cc/MZ3A-EPKK] (describing Southern District U.S. Attorney Preet
Bharara’s criticisms of the Newman decision).
39. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 423–24 (2016).
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and Maher’s brother-in-law.40 As I have shown elsewhere,41 insider trad-
ing has long recognized that a tip from a corporate insider to a family
member qualifies as a breach of fiduciary duty under the Dirks test, and
this result was sufficient to uphold Salman’s conviction.42
Despite the difference in factual context between Newman, which in-
volved tipping from corporate insiders to security analysts, and Salman,
which involved tipping between family members,43 Judge Rakoff, sitting
by designation on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,44 went out of his
way to address Newman in the Salman opinion. First, Judge Rakoff
broadly read Newman to require that the government prove that the tip-
per received a “tangible benefit” in order to establish liability in all cir-
cumstances.45 He then stated, “To the extent Newman can be read to go
so far, we decline to follow it.”46 The Supreme Court affirmed Salman’s
conviction, explaining that Dirks “easily resolves the narrow issue
presented here.”47 The opinion included a sentence, however, addressing
Judge Rakoff’s treatment of Newman and agreeing that his broad reading
of Newman’s holding was inconsistent with Dirks.48
This sentence, in turn, led to further mischief. Matthew Martoma was
criminally convicted of insider trading based on his use of non-public in-
formation he received about FDA drug trial results from Dr. Stuart
Gilman. Dr. Gilman tipped Martoma for pay; he participated in approxi-
mately forty-three consultations with Martoma for which he received
consulting fees of $1000 per hour.49 Thus, as in Salman, Martoma was an
40. Id. at 423–24.
41. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Family Ties: Salman and the Scope of Insider Trading Liabil-
ity, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 46, 54 (2016) (“The complexity of regulating insider trading
appropriately in this market environment should not be confused with an easy case like
Salman”).
42. See Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 429 (“[T]his case involves ‘precisely the “gift of confiden-
tial information to a trading relative” that Dirks envisioned’”) (internal citations omitted).
43. See Miriam Baer, Insider Trading’s Legality Problem, 127 YALE L.J. F. 129, 140
(2017) (“Salman depicted a contrasting set of facts [from Newman]”).
44. Ironically, by writing the opinion in Salman, Judge Rakoff was able to create a
“one-man circuit split.” Had Rakoff been sitting in his regular courtroom in the Southern
District of New York, he would have been obligated to follow the Newman decision. See
Pete Brush, How Jed Rakoff, One-Man Circuit Split, Saved Bharara’s Bacon, LAW360 (Jan.
15, 2017) (terming the Salman opinion a “West Coast end-run around the Second Circuit’s
Newman insider trading decision.”).
45. See United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1093 (2016).
46. Id.
47. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 427.
48. “To the extent the Second Circuit held that the tipper must also receive something
of a ‘pecuniary or similarly valuable nature’ in exchange for a gift to family or friends,
Newman, 773 F. 3d, at 452, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that this requirement is incon-
sistent with Dirks.” Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 428.
49. United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 61 (2017). Martoma met with a second
doctor, Dr. Joel Ross, whom he paid $1500 per hour. Id. at 62. See also James B. Stewart,
On Insider Trading, an Appeals Court Comes to Its Senses, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/14/business/insider-trading-court.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/8QEH-P4FC] (reporting that Dr. Gilman “earned hundreds of thousands of dol-
lars in consulting fees from Mr. Martoma”).
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easy case under the Dirks test.50 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals af-
firmed Martoma’s conviction, finding that Martoma and Dr. Gilman had
an “ongoing ‘relationship of quid pro quo.’”51 Nonetheless, the Martoma
panel chose not only to address the Newman decision, but to overrule it,52
despite the irregularity of one panel overruling rather than seeking to
have the entire Circuit consider the matter through an en banc hearing.53
Apart from the issue of whether Martoma’s treatment of Newman was
necessary, the Martoma court offered yet another interpretation of Dirks,
one that finds a personal benefit even in the absence of a relationship
between tipper and tippee.54 The Martoma decision thus leaves the scope
of tipping liability, even in the Second Circuit, in a state of confusion.
Reactions to these decisions have been mixed. As Donna Nagy ex-
plains, both courts and securities law scholars hold “divergent views” as
to the appropriate scope of tippee liability.55 Importantly, the scope of
the disagreement is broader than ascertaining what the Supreme Court
meant in Dirks with respect to the personal benefit test. Courts and schol-
ars appear to vary as to whether they view the type of communications at
issue in Dirks as “normal industry activity,”56 or an unfair trading advan-
tage available to those who have access to a privileged network.57
Importantly, although Newman, Salman, and Martoma address tippee
liability, the scope of the personal benefit test has important implications
for tipper liability as well. These implications are critical even though
government prosecutions have not prioritized the corporate insiders who
are the source of inside information. This was an issue that concerned the
50. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 49 (quoting John C. Coffee, Jr. describing Martoma as
“one of the easiest insider-trading cases I’ve ever seen”).
51. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 67.
52. See id. at 69 (concluding that Newman’s “‘meaningfully close personal relation-
ship’ requirement is no longer good law”).
53. See id. at 68 (acknowledging that “it would ordinarily be neither appropriate nor
possible for [a panel] to reverse an existing Circuit precedent”).
54. See Martoma, 869 F.3d at 81 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (explaining that “[t]he majority
today articulates a rule that permits inference of a personal benefit whenever an insider
makes a ‘gift’ of information to anyone”). See also Editorial, The Second Circuit’s Insider-
Trading Feud, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 17, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-second-cir-
cuits-insider-trading-feud-1505677304?mg=prod/accounts-wsj [https://perma.cc/FX7P-
XYVW] (explaining that “[a]las, the two judges misconstrued Salman”).
55. See Donna Nagy, Beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading, 42 IOWA
J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2016).
56. Brief for Law Professors Stephen Bainbridge, M. Todd Henderson, and Jonathan
Macey as Amici Curiae in Opposition to the United States of America’s Petition for Re-
hearing or Rehearing En Banc at 1–2, United States v. Newman (2014), (No. 13-1837-
cr(L)), 2015 WL 1064409.
57. See, e.g., Sara Almousa, Comment, Friends with Benefits? Clarifying the Role Rela-
tionships Play in Satisfying the Personal Benefit Requirement Under Tipper-Tippee Liabil-
ity, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1251, 1265 (2016) (observing that “[b]etween 2009 and 2013,
insider trading networks generated an estimated $928 million in illegal trading profits”).
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court in Newman58 and that I have raised elsewhere.59 A narrow reading
of the personal benefit test increases the incentives for tippers to create
vast information asymmetries that undermine market integrity.60 As Jim
Cox puts it, such a reading throws “the truly dirty culprit, the tipper, out
with the bathwater.”61
III. JUDICIAL LAWMAKING
Insider trading is an example of judicial lawmaking.62 Concededly, the
federal courts are not truly common law courts, and, in this case, they are
making law in the guise of interpreting a federal statute—§ 10(b).63
Nonetheless, because § 10(b) is an “open-textured statute,” its interpreta-
tion requires the courts to engage in the more expansive interpretive ex-
ercise associated with common law adjudication.64
Judicial lawmaking offers several advantages over traditional legisla-
tion, particularly where, as here, the courts are making law through a
partnership with Congress and the SEC. First, judicial lawmaking is flexi-
ble and incremental.65 The courts can offer a definition or theory of in-
sider trading that is specific to the facts of the case at bar without the
need, at that time, to consider other hypothetical factual scenarios. This
allows the courts to defer considerations about the breadth of its ap-
proach until they have the benefit of assessing the effect of their initial
efforts. Evaluating the costs and benefits of a prospective rule without the
58. See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2014) (observing that, as
of the date of the court’s decision, neither Ray nor Choi had been charged with insider
trading).
59. See Fisch, supra note 41, at 54 (observing that “corporate officials are in the best
position to prevent these situations by avoiding the selective disclosures that give profes-
sional traders advantages over other investors”).
60. Although the SEC adopted Regulation FD in an effort to limit those incentives,
the SEC has been unsuccessful in its effort to enforce Regulation FD aggressively. See, e.g.,
Jill Fisch, Regulation FD: An Alternative Approach to Addressing Information Asymmetry,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING 121 (Stephen M. Bainbridge ed., 2013)
(describing SEC’s “cautious” approach to enforcement of Regulation FD following its de-
feat in Siebel Systems).
61. James D. Cox, Giving Tippers a Pass: U.S. v. Newman, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan.
27, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/01/27/giving-tippers-a-pass-u-s-v-new-
man-3/ [https://perma.cc/87XA-WCG2].
62. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 21 (1985) (describing the lawmaking role of the federal courts).
63. Congressional delegation of lawmaking power to the courts through the use of an
open-ended statute is not unique to the federal securities laws. See Cass R. Sunstein, Inter-
preting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 421–22 (1989) (describing
this phenomenon and citing the Sherman Act as an example of Congress “delegat[ing]
power to make common law” to the courts).
64. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Chevron and Legislative History, 82 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1517, 1546–48 (2014).
65. In other contexts, judicial lawmaking has also been defended as efficient. See, e.g.,
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 235 (1979); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Effi-
cient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977). The efficiency claims have been disputed. See, e.g.,
Partnoy, supra note 5 at 293 n.45. Moreover, the claims about efficiency are grounded
largely in the litigation incentives of private parties, and their applicability to enforcement
litigation is less clear.
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experience of seeing that rule applied is also challenging. The SEC has
struggled with the task of trying to identify the effects of rules that con-
template policies with which the market has no experience.66 Legislation
can be sticky and difficult to adjust if it has unintended consequences, but
incremental interpretive decisions are more easily refined.
The insider trading context is particularly appropriate for judicial law-
making. Many commentators have observed that it is difficult to create a
precise definition for insider trading. Indeed, the government articulated
this rationale for judicial lawmaking in TGS itself. As SEC Assistant
General Counsel Frank E. Kennamer, Jr. told Federal District Judge
Dudley B. Bonsal during the TGS trial, it is “‘nearly impossible . . . to
define a rule fitting all situations’ in which corporate insiders may or may
not trade in their companies’ stock.”67 The definitional challenge is the
product of several factors—the continued evolution of the market, shift-
ing norms about the appropriate legal and moral response to information
disparities, and the ability of traders to develop new products, practices,
and strategies. As an example, in SEC v. Dorozhko, the Second Circuit
considered the extent to which someone who hacked into a computer
system to obtain nonpublic information could be prosecuted for insider
trading.68 A statutory definition of insider trading promulgated when
Congress adopted § 10(b) in 1934 would have been challenged to provide
better guidance on this question than the existing statute.
A second advantage of judicial lawmaking is the insulation of federal
judges, at least relative to the SEC and Congress, from political pressure.
Members of Congress are prone to introducing legislation in response to
high profile scandals. Financial regulation is complex, however, and a
hastily drafted statute can have adverse effects on the capital markets and
the economy. Government enforcement officials are subject to a range of
political pressures stemming from both the public and Congress. On the
one hand, these political pressures can cause prosecutors to fail in holding
wrongdoers accountable, especially if those wrongdoers are high-level
corporate officials.69 On the other hand, they can lead regulators to pur-
sue cases that produce headline-generating fines and penalties, but where
the nature of the wrongdoing is ambiguous.70 Such cases are particularly
palatable when the defendants are frequently criticized as amoral and
66. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Leave it to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of
Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 768 (2013) (criticizing the SEC for adopt-
ing a “mandatory one-size-fits-all rule” for proxy access despite its lack of experience with
such a rule and the inability to predict its effects).
67. Richard Phalon, S.E.C. Aide Says Insider Curb Is Varied from ‘Case to Case’, N. Y.
TIMES June 22, 1966, at B63.
68. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 43–44 (2d Cir. 2009).
69. Jesse Eisinger has explored the reasons for this behavior extensively. See JESSE
EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FAILS TO PROSE-
CUTE EXECUTIVES (Simon Schuster 2017).
70. See, e.g., Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s En-
forcement Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (2016) (identifying metrics used by agencies
to report their enforcement efforts and the incentives for reporting high numbers of ac-
tions and high levels of fines imposed).
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selfish. Hedge fund managers offer a prime example, as they are por-
trayed by corporate executives as predators who destroy corporate value
and by the media who claim they make billions of dollars for “basically
doing nothing.”71 Accordingly, political pressures might lead to a govern-
ment enforcement policy that takes an expansive view of tippee liability
in order to target wealthy hedge fund managers for insider trading.
Of course judicial lawmaking is not an effective constraint against all
political pressure. In particular, judicial lawmaking is necessarily reactive.
While courts can constrain instances of prosecutorial overreaching, they
cannot readily expand the scope of liability in the absence of political will
from the executive branch. The tipping cases illustrate this problem. Al-
though the Newman court arguably responded to its perception that the
SEC and the Department of Justice had pursued hedge funds too aggres-
sively, it could not correct for enforcement shortfalls, such as the failure
to prosecute the tippers who breach confidences to provide inside
information.
In addition, the flip side of political insulation is the absence of ac-
countability. Courts are simply less accountable for their policy judg-
ments with respect to the appropriate scope of insider trading liability
than Congress or the SEC.72 This lack of accountability is particularly
problematic when the courts cut back on the SEC’s expansive enforce-
ment efforts because, as Don Langevoort has observed, these efforts “tap
into images of power, greed and hubris” and as such, generate substantial
popular support.73
Highlighting the foregoing advantages to judicial lawmaking does not
mean that it is a panacea. The biggest problem with using the courts to
develop insider trading law is that the process increases uncertainty with
respect to the legality of information gathering and trading activity. If the
line between legitimate and illegitimate information-gathering efforts is
unclear or shifts over time, law-abiding traders will be deterred from ag-
gressive but legal research efforts for fear of liability exposure. As the
Fortune letter-writer put it, ambiguous insider trading law risks leaving
such traders “afraid that diligent review, analysis, and investigation on
behalf of my clients will land me before the SEC or worse yet a defendant
in a criminal case.”74
71. See Mark Gongloff, Piketty Is Right: These Wealthy Men Make Billions For Basi-
cally Doing Nothing, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/05/06/hedge-fund-managers-billions_n_5273307.html [https://perma.cc/KST3-B2VW].
72. In the context of insider trading, this lack of accountability is mitigated, in part, by
the fact that Congress has repeatedly ratified and built upon the framework of insider
trading regulation developed by the courts. See Fisch, supra note 3, at 479 (documenting
legislative endorsements of the courts’ insider trading liability regime).
73. Donald Langevoort, Reading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider
Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1329 (1999).
74. Anello, supra note 19, at 1–2 (asking “[i]f federal judges struggle with drawing a
line between proper and improper trading activity, how are those of us on Wall Street
supposed to do so?”).
760 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
The potential chilling effect of legal uncertainty is exacerbated in the
context of insider trading for two reasons. First, insider trading is one of
the few areas of securities law that is subject to extensive criminal as well
as civil enforcement. Although the standard of proof is higher in a crimi-
nal case, the potential that a trader will go to jail for conduct that the
government determines is illegal insider trading makes the potential cost
of such trading higher than in cases in which the liability exposure is
purely civil.75 Toward that end, it is worth noting that the government has
not confined itself to bringing criminal charges only after courts have con-
firmed the applicable legal theory in the civil context. Chiarella,
O’Hagan, Newman, Salman and Martoma were all criminal cases. As the
Newman court observed, “The Government has not cited, nor have we
found, a single case in which tippees as remote as Newman and Chiasson
have been held criminally liable for insider trading.”76
Second, a flexible standard can have the effect of giving the govern-
ment a tremendous amount of prosecutorial discretion.77 It can also lead
to biased enforcement efforts.78 The high cost of taking the government
to trial and the substantial stakes involved also put enormous pressure on
insider trading defendants to settle.79
The chilling effect of legal uncertainty may be somewhat less problem-
atic in the context of insider trading because the legal uncertainty argua-
bly reduces the potential for opportunism by market participants.80 If it is
difficult to determine the precise behavior that will subject a trader to
insider trading liability, it will be more difficult for a trader who would
skirt the law to identify the precise limits on his or her behavior. For this
75. See, e.g., Pitt & Shapiro, supra note 33, at 295 (“[W]hile defendants may not care
excessively about the adverse publicity that normally accompanies a court order requiring
them to obey the law, they normally do, and will, care about serving time in jail, or about
paying substantial monetary fines”).
76. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 448 (2d Cir. 2014).
77. See, e.g., Dave Michaels, No Law Needed on Insider Trading, SEC Chief Says,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/no-law-needed-on-insider-trad-
ing-sec-chief-says-1504733816 [https://perma.cc/F2WB-JJCJ] (explaining that a system in
which the courts determine the scope of permissible conduct “grants huge discretion to law
enforcement”).
78. See Joan Heminway, Just Do It! Specific Rulemaking on Materiality Guidance in
Insider Trading, 72 LOUISIANA L. REV. 1000, 1010–11 (2012) (warning that “the vagueness
of aspects of the legal standard for insider trading liability . . . when paired with the broad
enforcement discretion available in the insider trading enforcement process, invites the
introduction of enforcement biases”).
79. The high cost of defending oneself against insider trading charges is illustrated by
the example of Mark Cuban, who, although he ultimately prevailed against the SEC, paid
more than $8 million in legal fees to do so. See Natalie Posgate & Mark Curriden, Jury
Finds No Proof Mark Cuban Engaged in Insider Trading, DALLAS NEWS (Oct. 16, 2013),
https://www.dallasnews.com/business/business/2013/10/16/jury-finds-no-proof-mark-cuban-
engaged-in-insider-trading [https://perma.cc/4Q6R-T978].
80. See, e.g., Ted Kamman & Rory T. Hood, With the Spotlight on the Financial Crisis,
Regulatory Loopholes and Hedge Funds, How should Hedge Funds Comply with the In-
sider Trading Laws?, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 357, 404 (2009) (identifying various loop-
holes in existing insider trading regulation but suggesting that hedge funds would be “ill-
advised” to take advantage of them because of “the time and expense of defending them-
selves from an SEC investigation”).
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reason, some commentators have resisted a statutory definition on the
theory that, defining the precise boundaries of liability would create “a
roadmap for fraud.”81
IV. THE WAY FORWARD FOR INSIDER TRADING
As noted above, the continued uncertainty about the scope of insider
trading liability has repeatedly prompted commentators to call for legisla-
tion or the adoption of an SEC rule that would provide clarification.82
The problem, however, is that the increased precision of a statute or rule
would require policymakers to reach consensus on the appropriate scope
of the prohibition. Such consensus has consistently proved difficult. Al-
though most commentators agree that federal law should prohibit some
trading on the basis of material nonpublic information, the appropriate
scope of liability remains hotly contested.83
Consider, for example, the three bills introduced into Congress in 2015
in response to the Newman decision.84 The broadest prohibition, outlined
in the Reed–Menendez Bill, proposed to make it unlawful to trade “on
the basis of material information that the person knows or has reason to
know is not publicly available.”85 The bill thus incorporated a parity of
information standard similar to that reflected in the TGS decision.86
Some other jurisdictions take an analogous approach. The advantage of
the standard is that it “alleviates any inconsistencies in determining
whether one is in a fiduciary or similar relationship, whether one receives
or intended to receive a personal benefit, and the motive behind the dis-
closure. A consistent application of the rule will result in prohibiting indi-
81. See Stuart J. Kaswell, An Insider’s View of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988, 45 BUS. LAW. 145, 150 (1989) (recounting concern by congres-
sional lawmakers during the drafting of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforce-
ment Act of 1988 that providing a statutory definition of insider trading “might be under-
inclusive and constitute what many have called a ‘roadmap for fraud’”).
82. See, e.g., Carmen Germaine, Rakoff Urges Securities Bar To Write Insider Trading
Law, LAW360 (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/897188/rakoff-urges-securi
ties-bar-to-write-insider-trading-law [https://perma.cc/27E9-5YDJ] (quoting Judge Rakoff
as stating “The United States, by failing to recognize, unlike most other developed coun-
tries, that a meaningful effective straightforward, simple ban on insider trading is best
achieved through statute rather than judge made law, has created unnecessary uncertainty
and difficulty in dealing with the problem of insider trading”).
83. See Langevoort, supra note 73, at 1339 (“While there might be a fairly broad politi-
cal consensus that there should be some sort of insider trading prohibition, there is no
consensus whatsoever about where the line should be drawn on the specifics”); cf. Henry
Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog that Did Not Bark, 31 IOWA
J. CORP. L. 167, 183–85 (2005) (reviewing and updating his arguments in support of legal-
ized insider trading).
84. For detailed descriptions of all three bills see Brett T. Atanasio, Comment, “I’ll
Know It When I See It . . . I Think”: United States v. Newman and Insider Trading Legisla-
tion, 121 PENN ST. L. REV. 221, 238–50 (2016).
85. Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act, S. 702, 114th Cong., § 2 (2015) (inserting
§ 10(d)(1)(A)).
86. See Kenneth R. Davis, The Equality Principle: How Title VII Can Save Insider
Trading Laws, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 199, 202 (2017) (defending an equal access approach
as based on an equality principle).
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viduals from capitalizing on material, nonpublic information.”87
The problem with a parity of information standard is that it imposes
liability on anyone who is able to obtain an informational advantage, re-
gardless of the manner in which the informational advantage was ob-
tained.88 Specifically, it discourages legitimate research.89 Although
reasonable minds may disagree about how to draw the line between legit-
imate and wrongful efforts to obtain an informational advantage, there is
little question that investor research increases the efficiency of trading
prices and improves the effectiveness of capital markets discipline.
The Himes Bill focused its ban on trading on the use of information
that was obtained wrongfully.90 This approach is similar to that advocated
by many commentators. For example, Donna Nagy has proposed a “fraud
on contemporaneous traders” theory that, without requiring a breach of
fiduciary duty, would apply “when a person knowingly or recklessly uses
wrongfully obtained material nonpublic information in connection with a
securities transaction, or wrongfully communicates such information.”91
Although the Himes bill can be understood as an attempt to define
insider trading by codifying the wrongfulness standard, the challenge for
this approach is delineating what kind of conduct is considered wrongful.
As a Fortune magazine article observes, the analysis of wrongfulness is
both context-specific and can evolve over time.92 As a result, the Himes
Bill may not significantly reduce the ambiguity inherent in the existing
judge-made standard. Of course, legislation could add precision to the
concept of wrongfulness. Nagy suggests one way to do so by observing
that the SEC’s adoption of Regulation FD,93 by prohibiting selective dis-
closure of material nonpublic information by corporations and corporate
officials, makes a hedge fund’s acquisition of information in violation of
Reg FD wrongful, even in the absence of a personal benefit to the
tipper.94
The Lynch Bill sought to offer more precision by defining as “inside”
information, information that is (1) “nonpublic and obtained ‘illegally’”;
(2) from an issuer with an “expectation of confidentiality” or for use only
for legitimate business purposes; or (3) “in violation of a fiduciary
87. Laura Palk, Ignorance is Bliss: Should Lack of Personal Benefit Knowledge Immu-
nize Insider Trading?, 13 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 101, 147 (2016).
88. A parity of information standard would also significantly extend the scope of the
prohibition beyond existing law. As Mercer Bullard has explained, for example, the gov-
ernment routinely allows the sale of material nonpublic information, a policy that appears
to be based on “a conscious decision to permit insider trading on nonpublic information
that is available in a free market, while prosecuting insider trading on nonpublic informa-
tion that is not.” Mercer Bullard, Insider Trading in a Mannean Marketplace, 88 TEMP. L.
REV. 223, 262 (2016).
89. See Parloff, supra note 37.
90. Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 1625, 114th Cong., § 16A(a) (2015).
91. Nagy, supra note 55, at 57.
92. Parloff, supra note 37, at 6–12.
93. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,738–39 (Aug. 24,
2000) (codified as 17 C.F.R. 243.100–.103).
94. Nagy, supra note 55, at 41.
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duty.”95 The challenge for these definitions is twofold. First, to the extent
that the existence and violation of a fiduciary duty has proven to be a
difficult concept to apply, especially in the tipping cases, the Lynch Bill
fails to remedy that problem, again, retaining to some extent the ambigu-
ity of existing law. Second, the Bill does not appear to reach actions that
many commentators would view as clearly wrongful, such as Martoma’s
payments to Dr. Gilman for confidential information about FDA drug
trial results.
It is also important to recognize that part of the challenge in defining
insider trading is an ongoing disconnect between its origins in fraud and
deception96 and the moral overtones that appear to motivate both gov-
ernment enforcement actions and public condemnation. Specifically, as
Donald Langevoort has observed, “[O]ur intuitive understanding of what
insider trading is . . . reflects the belief that insider trading is a manifesta-
tion of greed on the part of the privileged.”97 Langevoort’s insight may
explain the government’s preference for pursuing insider trading prosecu-
tions against wealthy hedge funds that trade on insider information rather
than the sources of that information. Yet, as John Anderson explains,
moral and ethical principles do not supply clear guidance about the ex-
tent to which parties to a commercial transaction can take advantage of
information asymmetries.98
At the same time, courts and commentators, dating back to the Dirks
Court, have recognized the competing policy considerations that limit the
practicality of banning all trading on the basis of an information advan-
tage. The capital markets create high-powered incentives to encourage
market participants to seek out information and to incorporate that infor-
mation into their trading decisions. Informed trading increases price effi-
ciency and market discipline. Price efficiency increases the efficiency of
capital allocation. The resulting feedback loop and its effects on firm per-
formance produces societal value that extends beyond the capital
markets.99
In light of the absence of consensus on the appropriate scope of insider
trading liability and the competing policy considerations that underlie the
debate, a legislative definition is likely to be both under- and over-inclu-
sive. Responding to an audience question at a New York forum asking
95. Ban Insider Trading Act of 2015, H.R. 1173, 114th Cong., § 2(a) (2015); H.R. 1625
§ 2.
96. See Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in the Contemporary Law of In-
sider Trading, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 440 (2013) (explaining that insider trading
“is not really fraud”).
97. Id. at 439–40.
98. See JOHN ANDERSON, INSIDER TRADING: LAW, ETHICS AND REFORM (forthcom-
ing 2018) (exploring ethical and moral constraints on the use of informational advantages).
99. See, e.g., Andy Kessler, Unicorns need IPOs, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2018), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/unicorns-need-ipos-1515361043 [https://perma.cc/8WRF-XLUY]
(observing that “[t]he more companies are publicly traded, the more information quickly
gets into the market [and that] [c]apitalism can’t perform at its highest potential with large
opaque companies”).
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whether Congress should adopt insider trading legislation, SEC Chair-
man Jay Clayton responded, “[S]ome places that have a code-based in-
sider-trading regime, my sense is [that] it doesn’t work any better and in
fact it’s probably not as effective as our regime.”100 Clayton’s observation
is grounded in an untouted advantage of using the courts to develop in-
sider trading doctrine—the ability of judicial lawmaking to retain a level
of deliberate, and I argue constructive, ambiguity.
This article argues that the judge-made law of insider trading derives
part of its value from its ability to employ constructive ambiguity. The
term, as used here, is based on Michal Shur-Ofry and Ofer Tur-Sinai’s use
of the concept in analyzing intellectual property licenses.101 The idea of
constructive ambiguity has its roots in contract law and refers to situa-
tions in which the parties to a contract deliberately choose vague, incom-
plete, or inconsistent contract provisions rather than more precise terms.
As Shur-Ofry and Tur-Sinai explain, contract scholars generally view am-
biguity as undesirable.102 They explain, however, that ambiguous con-
tracts offer the parties a number of advantages, including increased
flexibility, adaptability, and lower transaction costs. In addition, ambigu-
ity allows parties, in some cases, to “get the deal done” by allowing them
to avoid addressing material issues on which they are unlikely to reach
agreement.103 Shur-Ofry and Tur-Sinai highlight the particular value of
ambiguity in commercial contracts that involve “the unpredictability and
opacity inherent in complex economic and social systems.”104 To support
this claim, they cite the work of Nassim Nicholas Taleb, who uses the
term “anti-fragility” to describe the ability to adapt to uncertainty and
unpredictability.105 Shur-Ofry and Tur-Sinai argue that anti-fragility is
one advantage of ambiguous contracts.106
The deliberate choice to retain ambiguity in preference to precision can
be a useful approach in areas other than contract law. Joe Grundfest and
Adam Pritchard have observed that legislators may choose to adopt an
ambiguous statute in order to maintain consensus or achieve a compro-
100. Dave Michaels, No Law Needed on Insider Trading, SEC Chief Says, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/no-law-needed-on-insider-trading-sec-chief-
says-1504733816?cx_= &cx_=&cx_artPos=0&cx_tag=collabctx&cx_navSource=News
Reel#cxrecs_s [https://perma.cc/KTD2-2KQ3].
101. Michal Shur-Ofry & Ofer Tur-Sinai, Constructive Ambiguity: IP Licenses as a Case
Study, 48 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 391, 391 (2015). There is a body of work in contract law
that addresses deliberate ambiguity and related concepts. See id. at 392 n.3 (citing litera-
ture). For an important related concept, see Gregory M. Duhl, Conscious Ambiguity: Slay-
ing Cerberus in the Interpretation of Contractual Inconsistencies, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 71,
72–79 (2009).
102. Shur-Ofry & Tur-Sinai, supra note 101, at 403.
103. Id. at 407. Cf. Duhl, supra note 101, at 77 (criticizing conscious ambiguity and
arguing that “courts should discourage lawyers from drafting intentionally ambiguous con-
tracts in the rush to get a deal done”).
104. Shur-Ofry & Tur-Sinai, supra note 101, at 411–12.
105. Id. at 411; see also NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, ANTIFRAGILE: THINGS THAT GAIN
FROM DISORDER 137 (Random House 2012).
106. Shur-Ofry & Tur-Sinai, supra note 101, at 412.
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mise.107 To the extent that Congress has consented to judicial develop-
ment of insider trading law and failed to adopt a statutory definition that
would make the scope of liability more precise, § 10(b) can be seen as the
choice of legislative ambiguity within the framework described by
Grundfest and Pritchard. This article argues that regardless of the con-
tours of the statute, courts have had fifty years to refine the parameters of
insider trading law since the TGS decision. Their failure to do so should
be understood as deliberate ambiguity.
As in contract law, ambiguity with respect to insider trading has advan-
tages and disadvantages. This article argues that the latent uncertainty
associated with an ambiguous legal standard is, in the context of insider
trading, advantageous. In particular, by enabling policymakers to main-
tain ambiguity about the permissible limits on the acquisition and use of
market-sensitive information, judicial lawmaking is able to balance the
competing concerns that animate the debate over insider trading in a way
that a code-based approach could not. As shown by the examples of the
2015 bills, a legislative approach that attempted to define illegal insider
trading with greater precision would, in light of the inherent tension in
the animating policy considerations, be both under- and over-inclusive.108
By retaining ambiguity, courts are able to preserve the scope and flexi-
bility of the insider trading ban. An ambiguous standard also furthers the
objectives of the moral indignation that fuels enforcement efforts by dis-
couraging market participants from structuring their conduct in ways that
fall too close to the line, as it is more difficult to skirt the edges of a vague
boundary between legal and illegal activity.109 At the same time, an am-
biguous approach enables the courts both to police enforcement over-
reaching and to adjust the liability standard to respond to evolving
market practices.110 In short, the ambiguity in the scope of insider trading
liability that has persisted since the TGS case should be understood as
constructive, and calls for legislative intervention should consider the
benefits of uncertainty and its costs.
107. Joseph Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders:
The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 628
(2002). Grundfest and Pritchard recognize that “judges also practice conscious ambiguity
as part of the art of judging.” Id. at 629.
108. This is not to argue against legislation as a way of choosing between competing
claims about the appropriate structure and scope of insider trading regulation. I proposed
this type of statutory fix more than twenty-five years ago. See Jill E. Fisch, Start Making
Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 202
(1991) (proposing legislation that shifts enforcement from criminal to civil and places
greater responsibility on tippers).
109. An ambiguous standard also reduces the potential for regulatory arbitrage. See,
e.g., Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 239 (2010) (explaining
regulatory arbitrage as the ability to exploit “gaps between legal form and economic
substance”).
110. In addition, as I have noted elsewhere, because insider trading law reflects a law-
making partnership between the courts, Congress, and the SEC, in which the courts have
taken the lead, Congress can oversee the courts’ judgments in this regard, and intervene if
necessary. Fisch, supra note 3, at 453.
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V. CONCLUSION
In the TGS decision, the federal courts accepted the role of developing
U.S. insider trading policy. Recent insider trading decisions, in which
courts have disagreed about the application of the judicially-developed
principles, offer reasons to question whether judicial lawmaking was de-
sirable and have caused commentators to renew their calls for clarifying
legislation. A fundamental impediment to a legislative solution is the
challenging normative question presented—determining the appropriate
limits on the use of material nonpublic information in the public trading
markets.
Judicial lawmaking offers a solution to the intractability of reaching
consensus on a definition of insider trading by allowing insider trading
law to retain a degree of deliberate ambiguity. This article suggests rea-
sons why that ambiguity may, in the context of insider trading regulation,
be constructive.
